

# **Formal Model Verification in the Industrial Software Engineering**

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Software Workhop

**“Efficient Development of Reliable Software and Related Methods”**

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## Dependable Software and Siemens Products



**Dependability** of a computing system is the ability to **deliver services that can justifiably be trusted.**

Ref. : A. Avizieniz, J.-C. Laprie, B. Randell: Fundamental Concepts of Dependability

**All Siemens Divisions** develop and sell products that perform mission-critical operations.

Most of these products contain an ever **increasing software part.**


**Dependability is decisive** for our commercial success.

Dependability yields higher confidence and acceptance, and is pre-condition to market access.

Following engineering standards gives **evidence of** a product's quality and **trustworthiness.**

**Dependability** relies on an **integral management & engineering** approach.


## Dependability Competence Team at Siemens Corporate Technology



- Safety / RAMS Engineering
- RAMS Analysis & Assessment
- Requirement Engineering
- Model Driven Development
- Code Quality Management
- Software Testing & Verification
- Validation & Certification
- Software Architectures
- Real-time Technology
- Embedded Platforms
- Fault-Tolerance
- ...


# Engineering of high-quality software

## Test levels – example V model



# Engineering of high-quality software


## Test levels, **Verification** & **Validation** – A closer View



## Formal Verification and Related Terms

- **Software Verification, Software Safety Validation (IEC61508)**  
**Verification & Validation, Static Analysis & Dynamic Testing**
  - See [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Formal\\_verification](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Formal_verification) :
  - **Validation**: "Are we building the right product?",  
i.e., does the product do what the user/the application really requires?
  - **Verification**: "Are we building the product right?",  
i.e., does the product conform to the specifications?
  - **The verification process consists of static and dynamic parts.**  
E.g., for a software product one can inspect the source code (static) and run against specific test cases (dynamic). Validation usually can only be done dynamically.
  - **Formal Method (IEC61508)**  
**Formal Specification**
  - **Formal Proof (IEC61508)**  
**Formal Verification, Model Checking/Theorem Proving**
    - See [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Formal](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Formal_formal_methods) :  
[formal methods](#) in computer science, including:  
[formal specification](#) describes what a system should do  
[formal verification](#) proves correctness of a system

# Embedding Formal Verification into Software Development Life-Cycle





# Formal Model Verification – SPIN tool

**SPIN** (Bell Labs, G. Holzmann):

Characteristics of method:


- 1) exhaustive verification
- 2) space compression
- 3) probabilistic verification (hashing)

Model in **PROMELA** (C-like language, CSP-based) is automatically translated into the extended FSMs.

These FSMs are verified to be correct according to correctness requirements. Correctness requirements are presented in **Linear Temporal Logic (LTL)**

**SPIN-based technologies are used:**

- Bell-Labs (network switches, OS Plan 9)
- NASA (Cassini mission at Saturn, Deep Space 1)
- Siemens CT




SPIN website  
<http://spinroot.com/spin/whatispin.html>  
 Wikipedia  
[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SPIN\\_model\\_checker](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SPIN_model_checker)



# Example A System Structure


**Customized Line Discipline**  
**Serial Line: 57600 bps**  
**Error Protection:**  
 •Serial Line: Parity Bit  
 •Protocol Level: BCC for data in messages

## Peer Device



**Object under Analysis**

## System




Serial Line

Example A  
Safety Property (1)

**Safety Property:** Any order of STX\_DATA and DLE messages will be correctly received and Receiver achieves TFirstChar state after TDLE2 state.

**Modeling Solution:** Sender generates valid messages STX\_DATA and DLE in all possible sequences.




**OK:  
Property Valid**

**Property Parts:**

```
#define a (ReceiveState==TDLE2)
#define b (ReceiveState==TFirstChar)
```

**Safety Property for Model Verification in Linear Temporal Logic:**


```
[] (<> a -> <> b)
```



Example A  
Safety Property (2)

**Safety Property:** Any order of STX\_DATA and DLE messages will be correctly received and Receiver achieves TFirstChar state after TDLE2 state if the noise char comes suddenly.

**Modeling Solution:** Sender generates valid messages STX\_DATA and DLE in all possible sequences. **We allow receiving of noisy char.**




**Error:  
Property Invalid**

**Property Parts:**

```
#define a (ReceiveState==TDLE2)
#define b (ReceiveState==TFirstChar)
```

**Safety Property for Model Verification in Linear Temporal Logic:**

```
[] (<> a -> <> b)
```




## Example A

### Error Analysis for Property (2) : Source Code

```

switch (theDriverData->ReceiveState) {
  case TFirstChar:
    switch (theChar) {
      (...)
      case TDRVDLE:
        theDriverData->ReceiveState = TDLE2; break;
    }
  (...)
  case TDLE2:
    if(theChar == '?' || theChar == TDRVENQ)
      theEvent = TDLEReceived;
    if(atomic_read(&theDriverData->WabtCounter) == 50) {
      atomic_set(&theDriverData->WabtCounter, 0);
      theDriverData->ReceiveState = TFirstChar;
    }
  }
break;
(...)

```



**Error:**  
**Property Invalid**

**Explanation:**  
SPIN shows that DRV could be blocked if noisy (incorrect) char came after TDRVDLE.

**NOTE:** the real driver will wait 50 timeouts (~5-20 sec) before it starts receiving of next telegram (e.g. STX\_DATA)

## Example A

### FMV Results for the Driver

#### Operational threats identified by SPIN:

- Long delay identified if 1 noise char comes
- Data loss within telegram receiving found

#### Model-building review:

- Performance bottleneck could create high interrupts latency
  - Wrong API-version calls
  - “Magic Constants” used in code
  - “Dead Code” identified
- 



## Summary (1)

### Objects and Focus Setting

#### Objects under Analysis:

- Protocols and Interfaces (especially under construction)
- Interacting components (e.g. new architecture or critical mechanism)
- Data access and control logic in parallel and distributed system

#### Additional Focus set on:

- System Initialization
- Restart of Components
- Communication Delays and Faults

#### Fault Types:

- Deadlock/Livelock
- Endangered Safety
- Integrity violation
- Correctness violation
- Non-expected communication order
- Race Conditions
- ...

#### Robustness Aspects:

- Standard operation
- Unpredictable rare impact
- “Aggressive/Noisy Environment”

## Dos & Don'ts

• Improve verification capabilities in early phases by introducing formal techniques.

• Increase precision in specifications. Apply formal techniques at design and fight ambiguities.

• Promote formally motivated checks into standard peer reviews.

• Focus formal techniques on architectural hotspots: complex, critical, risky, central parts

• Exploit formal results for test case definition: use failure traces to focus tests on design flaws.

• Don't believe in wonders. Formal verification is not cheap and needs invests in early phases.

• Don't act without concept. Tools need evaluation, and competence needs to be built.

• Don't apply formal techniques as rescue belt. It's not to patch ambiguous results from less mature processes.


• Don't believe you will not need to test your software any more. Formal verification does not replace testing phases.

• Don't believe your software is completely verified. You only proved that a model fulfills certain properties. That's it – no more, no less.

Don't split theory and practice.

Closely align work of formal teams and safety/development teams.

# The Formal Hype Cycle





## Challenges for Formal Model Verification

### Challenges

- Decrease modeling efforts
- Increase usability, reduce qualification degree needed
- Integration with tools for software development
- Traceability from modeling phase to testing phase
- Automated properties and models extraction from heterogeneous input material
- Again coverage and completeness issues  
“How much will be sufficient?”
- ...

**Model Checking gains importance:**

***“The behavior of even nonbuggy distributed applications can easily defy our human reasoning skills.”***

*Logic Verification of ANSI C code with SPIN*

*Gerard J. Holzmann*

## Summary (2)

### Reasons for Formal Model Verification

#### **Standards recommend formal methods and proofs**

e.g. IEC61508 : SIL2/3/4 - for design, verification, safety validation.

#### **Formal methods emerge at the industry sector**

easier to use tooling (Open Source, Tool Vendors), best practices (space/military, avionics, transportation/automotive, Microsoft).

**Formal methods improve precision** within development, capturing and ensuring functional and **non-functional properties**.

**Early correctness proof** of design concepts prevents design faults to propagate into development, test and operation phase.

**Byzantine failures** with hard to identify root-causes often are the consequence of weakly defined or misunderstood requirements.

**Environmental impact and sporadic influences** which are hard to test can be incorporated into formal models.

Stronger evidence of safety-related claims; amends test results and **improves acceptance by certification authorities**.

## Conclusions

- **Increasing complexity and importance of software**

More and more safety-relevant functions, which nowadays might be executed manually by human, will be realized in software and taken over automatically by the technical system.

- **Traditionally software plays a subordinate role**

In systems engineering and also in relevant standards the current perspective on software is that of an subordinate element. This is expected to change with the growing pervasiveness of software especially in safety-relevant development.

- **Formal verification in practice applied to selected software parts**

In the current practice formal verification is applied to verify selected system aspects. It already proved usefulness and applicability.

- **Cost and complexity of formal techniques are further high**

Up to now formal verification is not an easy-to-use technique. At this time it is not seen to enable a complete software/system verification.

- **Formal Verification does not/will never replace systematic testing**

Formal verification adds precision to the traditional verification process. It extends, but does not replace rigorous testing. Size limitations and abstractions of models through formal verification are to be carefully verified in reality.

Thank you for your attention.

Do you have some questions ?

# Backup

# Fundamental Concepts of Dependability

(A. Avizieniz, J.-C. Laprie, B. Randell)




Figure 1 - The dependability tree

Computing systems are characterized by four fundamental properties: functionality, performance, cost, and dependability.

Concepts of Dependability developed by A. Avizieniz, J.-C. Laprie, B. Randell

## Definitions: Dependability Attributes

**Dependability** is an integrative concept that encompasses the following system attributes:

- **Availability**: readiness for correct service
- **Reliability**: continuity of correct service
- **Safety**: absence of catastrophic consequences on the user(s) and the environment
- **Confidentiality**: absence of unauthorized disclosure of information
- **Integrity**: absence of improper system state alterations
- **Maintainability**: ability to undergo repairs and modifications

### Compound attributes:

- **Survivability**: system capability to resist a hostile environment so that it can fulfill its mission (MIL-STD-721, DOD-D-5000.3)
- **Security**: Dependability with respect to the prevention of unauthorized access and/or handling of information (Laprie, 1992)

\* **RAM / RAMS**: acronyms for reliability, availability, maintainability, and safety

## IEC61508-3: Formal Methods

**Formal methods** are a specification technique.

Formal methods (see IEC61508-7, C2.4) are for example, CCS, CSP, HOL, LOTOS, OBJ, temporal logic, VDM and Z.

**Formal methods** are recommended (R SIL2/3, HR SIL4) for

- 7.2/Table A.1:  
Software safety requirements specification
- 7.4.3/Table A.2:  
Software design and development: software architecture design
- 7.4.5/Table A.4:  
Software design and development: detailed design
- 7.7/Table A.7/Table B5  
Modeling in the context of software safety validation

Sometimes mixed up with **semi-formal methods** e.g. **finite state machines (FSM)**

- semi-formal methods (table B.7):  
Logic/function block diagrams, sequence diagrams, data flow diagrams, finite state machines/state transition diagrams, e.a.



## IEC61508-7, C2.4: Formal Methods (ii)

- Focus: Logic/HW
  - **HOL – Higher Order Logic for HW verification**
  - **Temporal logic – Formal demonstration of safety and operational requirements**
- Focus: Sequential processes
  - **OBJ – Algebraic specification of operations on abstract data types (ADT, similar to ADA packages).**
  - **Z – Specification language notation for sequential systems**
  - **VDM – Vienna Development Method (VDM++ concur. extension)**
- Focus: Communicating concurrent processes
  - **LOTOS, extends CCS – Calculus of Communicating Systems**
  - **CSP – Communicating Sequential Processes**
- Other semi-formal techniques (see B.2.3.2)
  - **Finite state machines/state transition diagrams for control structures**
  - **Petri nets (graph theory) for concurrent, asynchronous control flow; extension: time concept, data/information flow**

## IEC61508-3: Formal Proofs

**Formal proofs** are recommended (R SIL2/3, HR SIL4) for

- IEC61508-3/7.9/Table A.9: Software verification

**Formal proofs** are a static means for software verification

NOTE 3 – In the early phases of the software safety lifecycle verification is static, for example inspection, review, formal proof. When code is produced dynamic testing becomes possible. It is the combination of both types of information that is required for verification.

For example code verification of a software module by static means includes such techniques as software inspections, walk-throughs, static analysis, formal proof. Code verification by dynamic means includes functional testing, white-box testing, statistical testing.

It is the combination of both types of evidence that provides assurance that each software module satisfies its associated specification.

Sometimes mixed up with static analysis e.g. symbolic execution:

- Static analysis (table A.9, table B.8): e.g. Walk-through/design reviews, control flow / data flow analysis, or symbolic execution, e.a.



# Outline of Formal Model Verification

## Main Steps:

### Objects under Analysis

identification in software project

**Correctness properties** definition for Objects under Analysis


Creation of **model** for Objects in PROMELA

Model **verification** by SPIN and findings analysis

**Report** preparation on verification results

## Further promising actions:

- Automate procedure of model creation from C/C++ sources





SIEMENS

## SPIN model checker (ii)

Wikipedia [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SPIN\\_model\\_checker](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SPIN_model_checker)

SPIN is a tool for software [model checking](#). It was written by [Gerard J. Holzmann](#) and others, and has evolved for more than 15 years. SPIN is an automata-based model checker. Systems to be verified are described in [Promela](#) (*Process Meta Language*), which supports modeling of [asynchronous distributed algorithms](#) as [non-deterministic automata](#). Properties to be verified are expressed as [Linear Temporal Logic \(LTL\)](#) formulas, which are negated and then converted into [Büchi automata](#) as part of the model-checking algorithm. In addition to model-checking, SPIN can also operate as a simulator, following one possible execution path through the system and presenting the resulting execution trace to the user. Since [1995](#), (approximately) annual SPIN workshops have been held for SPIN users, researchers, and those generally interested in [model checking](#). In [2001](#), the [Association for Computing Machinery](#) awarded SPIN its System Software Award.

Holzmann, G. J., *The SPIN Model Checker: Primer and Reference Manual*. [Addison-Wesley](#), 2004. [ISBN 0-321-22862-6](#).

SPIN website <http://spinroot.com/spin/whatispin.html>



# Snapshot of SPIN Verification Screen

The screenshot displays the SPIN CONTROL 4.0.2 interface with several windows open:

- Linear Time Temporal Logic Formulae:** Shows a formula `! [<a> <b1 && b2>]` and options for property holding (All Executions or No Executions).
- Code Editor:** Displays C code for SDN driver data handling, including state transitions and watchdog logic.
- Data Values:** Lists current values for variables like `CharBCC = 66`, `SDNReceiveLength = 2`, and `SDNReceiveState = 3`.
- Simulation Output:** Shows execution steps such as `proc 1 [sdn_input] line 129 'pan_in' (state 37)` and `SetWatchdogCounter=0`.
- Control Flow Graph:** A graph with nodes (e.g., 91, 115, 135, 153, 175, 199, 221, 233) and edges, with a red arrow indicating a cycle.



## SPIN model checker (iii) – References

Wikipedia [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SPIN\\_model\\_checker](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SPIN_model_checker)

SPIN Website <http://spinroot.com/spin/whatispin.html>

An overview paper of Spin, with verification examples, is:

*The Model Checker Spin,*

IEEE Trans. on Software Engineering,

Vol. 23, No. 5, May 1997, pp. 279-295.

[\(PDF\)](#)

The automata-theoretic foundation for Spin:

*An automata-theoretic approach to automatic program verification,*

by Moshe Y. Vardi, and Pierre Wolper,

Proc. First IEEE Symp. on Logic in Computer Science,

1986, pp. 322-331.

[\(PDF\)](#)

## Linear Temporal Logic : SYNTAX

LTL - Linear Temporal Logic

Best to specify safety and correctness properties

See also [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linear\\_Temporal\\_Logic](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linear_Temporal_Logic)

### SYNTAX

**Grammar:**  $ltl ::= opd \mid ( ltl ) \mid ltl \text{ binop } ltl \mid unop \ ltl$

#### Unary Operators (unop):

- $[]$  (the temporal operator *always*),
- $\langle \rangle$  (the temporal operator *eventually*),
- $!$  (the boolean operator for *negation*)

#### Binary Operators (binop):

- $U$  (the temporal operator *strong until*)
- $V$  (the dual of U):  $(p \ V \ q) == !(p \ U \ !q)$
- $\&\&$  (the boolean operator for *logical and*)
- $\|\|$  (the boolean operator for *logical or*)
- $->$  (the boolean operator for *logical implication*)
- $\langle ->$  (the boolean operator for *logical equivalence*)

**Operands (opd): Predefined: true, false**



## Linear Temporal Logic (ii)

Extension of classical logic ( $\wedge, \vee, \neg, \Rightarrow, \forall, \exists$ )

- works over an (infinite) sequence of states

New operators:

○ *next time*

- $\varphi$      $\varphi$  holds at time  $t + 1$

◇ *eventually*

- ◇  $\varphi$      $\varphi$  holds at some time  $t + n$

□ *always*

- $\varphi$      $\varphi$  holds for all future times  $t + n$

**U** *until*

- $\varphi \text{ U } \psi$      $\varphi$  holds for all future times until the time where  $\psi$  holds

**∩** *release*

- $\varphi \text{ ∩ } \psi$     either  $\varphi$  holds forever, or until  $\varphi$  and  $\psi$  holds at the same time